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SURVEY OF ILLINOIS LAWCIVIL PROCEDURE
Diane S. Kaplan*
Donald L. Beschle**
I.

INTRODUCTION

This year's survey of Illinois civil procedure focuses on the work
of both the state and federal courts and the General Assembly. One
of the most important developments in state civil procedure law
during the last year was the legislative revision of Illinois' long-arm
statute. The courts addressed a wide range of topics, most notably
in the areas of jurisdiction, pleading, discovery, sanctions, and judgments. This survey article discusses the most significant among these
developments.
Section II looks at recent developments in jurisdiction, such as
the revision of Illinois' long-arm statute, personal jurisdiction, subject
matter jurisdiction and notice. Section III discusses recent decisions
relating to pleadings, particularly those involving questions of statute
of limitations and standing. Sections IV and V look at recent case
law regarding discovery and imposition of sanctions. Section VI
concludes this article with a discussion of judgments, specifically
issues involving voluntary dismissals, collateral estoppel, vacation of
judgments and comity.
II.
A.

JURISDICTION

Revised Long-Arm Statute

The most important legislative development in the area of civil
procedure during 1989 was the substantial reworking of the Illinois
long-arm statute. Since InternationalShoe v. Washington, introduced

*

Associate Professor of Law, The John Marshall Law School. B.A. 1971, University of

California at Berkeley; J.D. 1975, The Yale Law School.
** Associate Professor of Law, The John Marshall Law School. B.A. 1973, Fordham
University; J.D. 1976, New York University School of Law; LL.M. 1987, Temple University
School of Law.
The authors wish to thank research assistants Nancy Paullin and Johnny Leon-Guerra.
1. 326 U.S. 310 (1945).

HeinOnline -- 14 S. Ill. U. L.J. 699 1989-1990

Southern Illinois University Law Journal

[Vol. 14

the modern framework for testing the constitutional limits of personal
jurisdiction, 2 states have varied in their statutory responses to the
potential expansion of jurisdictional power. A few states, most

notably California, adopted the simple statement that their courts
are authorized to exercise jurisdiction on any constitutional basis.'
Most states, including Illinois, adopted long-arm statutes that set
forth a list of specific acts which could subject a non-resident
defendant to the personal jurisdiction of the forum. 4 A few states

combined the two approaches.'
A comparison of the laundry-list style statutes with the due
process statutes may suggest that legislative endorsement of the
former approach was a conscious repudiation of the latter. However,

in 1957, the Illinois Supreme Court stated in Nelson v. Miller,6 that
the statute was clearly intended to extend long-arm jurisdiction to
the limits of due process. With that decision, the court began a
generation of jurisdictional analysis which, while referring to the
limiting language of the statute, interpreted it as if it were co-extensive
7
with due process.
In the 1981 case of Green v. Advance Ross Electric Corp.,' the
Illinois Supreme Court rejected this construction as overbroad, holding that the statute "should have a fixed meaning without regard to
changing concepts of due process . . . ." Consequently, some acts
by non-residents could satisfy due process but not fall within the
specific language of the statute, thus depriving Illinois courts of a

basis for exercising jurisdiction. 9 This discrepancy became most ap-

2. According to International Shoe, "due process requires only that in order to subject a
defendant to a judgment in personam . . . he have certain minimum contacts . . . such that
the maintenance of the suit does not offend 'traditional notions of fair play and substantial
justice."' Id. at 316.
3. CAL. CIv. PRO. CODE § 410.10 (1973).
4. For a complete list of state long-arm statutes, see Beyler, The Illinois Long Arm
Statute: Background, Meaning, and Needed Repairs, 12 S. ILL. U.L.J. 293, 296 n.2 (1988).
5. IOWA CODE ANN. § 617.3 (West Supp. 1990); NEB. REV. STAT. § 25-536 (1989); S.D.
CODIFID LAW ANN. § 15-7-2 (West Supp. 1990) & § 47-8-17 (1983).
6. 11 111. 2d 378, 389, 143 N.E.2d 673, 679 (1957). See also Beyler, supra note 4, at 307.
However, in an article written after the original passage of the statute, Professor Cleary, the
intellectual father of Illinois' long-arm statute, recognized that while the enactment did not
extend to the limits of the due process clause, it did include all the jurisdictional bases
considered to be consistent with International Shoe. Cleary & Seder, Extended Jurisdictional
Bases for the Illinois Courts, 50 Nw. U.L. REv. 599 (1955).
7. See Beyler supra note 4, at 297-98.
8. 86 Ill. 2d 431, 436, 427 N.E.2d 1203, 1206 (1981).
9. For an example of such a factual situation, see Hellriegel v. Sears Roebuck & Co.,
157 F. Supp. 718 (N.D. Ill. 1957).
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parent in cases to enforce child support obligations, 0 which largely
provided the political impetus for the 1989 legislative revisions of the
long- arm statute."
The revised statute is an almost exact formulation of a proposed
long-arm statute set forth in the Southern Illinois University Law
Journal in 1988 by Professor Keith Beyler. 2 The statute adopts the
"hybrid" approach of first listing specific acts which will subject
non-residents to jurisdiction, and then adding a general provision
stating that, in addition, courts may exercise jurisdiction on any basis
consistent with due process. Pertinent sections of the new statute
read as follows, with the revised language italicized:
§ 2-209. Act submitting to jurisdiction-Process.
(a) Any person, whether or not a citizen or resident of this State,
who in person or through an agent does any of the acts hereinafter
enumerated, thereby submits such person, and, if an individual, his
or her personal representative, to the jurisdiction of the courts of
this State as to any cause of action arising from the doing of any
of such acts:
(1) The transaction of any business within this State;
(2) The commission of a tortious act within this State;
(3) The ownership, use, or possession of any real estate situated in
this State;
(4) Contracting to insure any person, property or risk located within
this State at the time of contracting;
(5) With respect to actions of dissolution of marriage, declaration
of invalidity of marriage and legal separation, the maintenance in
this State of a matrimonial domicile at the time this cause of action
arose or the commission in this State of any act giving rise to the
cause of action;
(6) With respect to actions brought under the Illinois Parentage Act
of 1984, as now or hereafter amended, the performance of an act
of sexual intercourse within this State during the possible period of

10. The Illinois Supreme Court extended the language of the statutory provision providing
that a "tortious act" within Illinois would include the failure to pay child support obligations
in In re Marriage of Highsmith, 111 Ill. 2d 69, 74, 488 N.E.2d 1000, 1003 (1986). In Highsmith,
the custodial father sent his daughter to live with her grandparents in Illinois and then
attempted to transfer custody to them. Even though the father's acts were deemed sufficient
to satisfy due process requirements for Illinois long-arm jurisdiction, a failure to provide child
support is not a tort in traditional terms. Professor Beyler maintained that the Highsmith
court went beyond the intended meaning of the "tortious act" provision. Beyler, supra note
4, at 416. Despite Highsmith, the General Assembly apparently felt that Illinois courts might
still lack constitutionally permissible jurisdiction in some child support cases.
11. P.A. 86-840, 1989 Ill. Laws 4629 (effective Sept. 7, 1989).
12. Beyler, supra note 4.
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conception;
(7) The making or performance of any contract or promise
substantially connected with this State;
(8) The performance of sexual intercourse within this State which
is claimed to have resulted in the conception of a child who resides
in this State;
(9) The failure to support a child, spouse or former spouse who
has continued to reside in this State since the person either formerly
resided with them in this State or directed them to reside in this
State;
(10) The acquisition of ownership, possession or control of any
asset or thing of value present within this State when ownership,
possession or control was acquired;
(11) The breach of any fiduciary duty within this State;
(12) The performance of duties as a director or officer of a
corporation organized under the laws of this State or having its
principal place of business within this State;
(13) The ownership of an interest in any trust administered within
this State; or
(14) The exercise of powers granted under the authority of this
State as a fiduciary.
(b) A court may exercise jurisdiction in any action arising within
or without this State against any person who:
(1) Is a natural person present within this State when served:
(2) Is a natural person domiciled or resident within this State
when the cause of action arose, the action was commenced, or
process was served;
(3) Is a corporation organized under the laws of this State; or
(4) Is a natural person or corporation doing business within
this State.
(c) A court may also exercise jurisdiction on any other basis now
or hereafter permitted by the Illinois Constitution and the
13
Constitution of the United States.

The key part of the statute, indeed the only part which is actually
necessary, is subsection (c), which returns Illinois courts to the pre1981 practice of treating Illinois' long-arm statute as co-extensive
with due process. This time, however, the "one-step" inquiry is
authorized by statute rather than by judicial decree.
In light of subsection (c), the necessity of setting forth the
specific acts of subsection (a) is unclear. Subsection (c), in conferring
jurisdiction on all constitutionally permissible bases, clearly imports

13. ILL. REV.

STAT.

ch. 110,

2-209 (1989).
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any and all of the specific acts of subsection (a) which meet due
process requirements. On the other hand, the specific language of
subsection (a) may not extend beyond the limitations of subsection
(c) and authorize the exercise of jurisdiction in any manner that
would offend the state or federal constitutions. 14 Hence, the main
purpose of subsection (a) appears to be illustrative-to specify to
attorneys the types of acts generally considered sufficient to satisfy
due process, and to inform citizens of the types of acts the consequences of which they can expect to answer for in Illinois courts. 5
While most of the specific bases for jurisdiction listed in section
2-209(a) seem clearly sufficient to satisfy due process, at least one
category is highly suspect. Professor Beyler proposed, and the legislature adopted, subsection (a)(8), which purports to confer jurisdiction on the basis of "sexual intercourse within this State which is
claimed to have resulted in the conception of a child." Although
Illinois is not the first state to attempt to base jurisdiction on claims
of conception occurring within its borders in cases involving parental
duties, 16 it is quite likely that this act alone is too minimal to satisfy
due process unless applied in the context of some other affiliating
contacts with the state.
For example, in Kulko v. Superior Court, 7 the United States
Supreme Court applied the InternationalShoe test in the context of
a dispute involving child support. The Court held that California
lacked sufficient minimum contacts to support jurisdiction where the
father and mother, New York residents, had been married in California during a "three-day stopover" in that state prior to the father's

14. Professor Beyler notes that some Supreme Court cases, including Kulko v. Superior
Court, 436 U.S. 84 (1978), contain language stating that in the particular case the state involved
had not "expressed its interest" in jurisdiction by enacting a specific provision applicable in
that case. Id. at 98. This omission, he notes, suggests that by identifying its interest in asserting
jurisdiction on the basis of a specific set of facts, a state might make it more likely that the
extension of jurisdiction will be upheld. Beyler, supra note 4, at 418-19. Professor Beyler is
correct in suggesting that such a conclusion is "misguided"; wishing, and even codifying, no
matter how clearly, should not make it so, at least with respect to the scope of the due process
clause.
15. Beyler, supra note 4, at 413-14.
16. See e.g., KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-308(bXlo) (1983); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 454.210(2)(a)(8)
(Michie 1988); LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 13.3201(7) (West Supp. 1990); ME. Rav. STAT. ANN.
tit. 14, § 704-A(2)(E) (1980); MD. CTs. & JuD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 6-103.2 (1989); N.D.R.
Civ. P. 4(b)(1) (Supp. 1985); ORE. R. Civ. P. 4(K)(3) (1989); S.D. CODIFIED LAW ANN § 157-2(8) (1981); TEX. Fu,. CODE ANN. § 11.051(1) (Vernon 1986); WASH. REv. CODE ANN. §
4.28.185(l)(e) (1988). See also Beyler, supra note 4, at 416.
17. 436 U.S. 84 (1978).
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departure for military duty in Korea." The mother returned to New
York immediately, as did the father following his tour of duty, and
in 1961 and 1962 their two children were born there. Ten years later
the parties divorced, and the mother moved to California. The father
consented to an agreement which allowed the children to spend part
of the year with their mother in California and obligated him to
make child support payments. The Court held that the three-day
stopover in California, the marriage in California, the presence of
the wife and children in California, and the father's consent to the
custody agreement were insufficient contacts to render him subject
to California's jurisdiction. The father's acts would not lead "a
reasonable parent" to anticipate "the substantial financial burden
and personal strain of litigating a child-support suit in a forum 3,000
miles away." 9
Kulko, as well as numerous commercial cases, focused on whether
the defendant engaged in such activities in relation to the forum as
to render the state's exercise of jurisdiction over that defendant
foreseeable. 20 Professor Beyler defends the "sexual intercourse" provision, even in the case of "a one-night stay in the state", on the
grounds that the consequences are not more remote or unforeseeable
than an auto accident resulting from "a one-night drive through the
state." 2' This argument is not persuasive. The chance that a single
act of intercourse will lead to conception, and that a child will be
born, and that the relationship of the parents will be severed, and
that the parent with custody will choose to live subsequently in the
state of conception seem marginally, if at all, analogous to a car
passing through a state.
Assume, for example, that the Kulkos consummated their marriage in California during their three-day stop-over. The conjugal
acts of Mr. Kulko in California are indistinguishable from those
claimed to be sufficient to satisfy due process in section 2-209(a)(8).

18. Id. at 86.
19. Id. at 97.
20. The standard of jurisdictional foreseeability differs from the tort standard of foreseeability. Tort foreseeability looks to whether the consequences of the defendant's acts are
probable or predictable. It assesses the predictability of probabilities to the reasonable person.
Judicial foreseeability looks to whether the defendant purposefully directed his activities to the
forum, thereby giving rise to the presumption that when there is intent and purposeful activity
directed to the forum, the defendant can reasonably expect to be sued in the forum for the
consequences of those acts. Kaplan, Civil Procedure Lecture Series, The John Marshall Law
School. See World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286 (1980).
21. Beyler, supra note 4, at 416-17.
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In terms of Mr. Kulko's "acceptance" of the possibility of jurisdiction, what difference does it make where conception took place?
Consider the following hypothetical: Two law students from
New York attend a conference in Chicago, where they engage in
sexual relations. They also have sexual relations upon their return to
New York. Nine months later, a baby is born. The couple marries.
Ten years later they divorce. The wife and child move to Chicago.
Is there long-arm jurisdiction over the husband in Illinois? Yes, under
section 2-209(a)(8). Does this long-arm jurisdiction assist Illinois
courts in providing financial support to children residing within its
borders? Yes. Is it constitutional? No. Why not? Because the act of
conception is too fortuitous, isolated and singular to serve as a
dispositive jurisdictional contact. What happens to the foreseeability
analysis if one or both parties used birth control? If the man has a
low sperm count? If there are multiple putative fathers? Assuming
that a "claim" of conception 22 is too minimal a contact to satisfy
due process, is Illinois' interest in the issue strong enough to bootstrap
a weak case of minimum contacts with other affiliating circumstances
23
as permitted by Burger King v. Rudzewicz? We think not.2
The legislature would have been on firmer constitutional ground
had it provided that the act of intercourse take place when one or
both parties were residents of Illinois .21 Several state courts have
upheld long-arm jurisdiction based on claims of residence and con-

22. See infra note 26 and accompanying text.
23. 471 U.S. 462 (1985). In "appropriate casefs]," the courts may evaluate "the burden
on the defendant," "the forum State's interest in adjudicating the dispute," "the plaintiff's
interest in obtaining convenient and effective relief," "the interstate judicial system's interest
in obtaining the most efficient resolution of controversies," and the "shared interest of the
several States in furthering fundamental substantive social policies." Id. at 476-77. See also
World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 292 (1980). These considerations
sometimes serve to establish the reasonableness of jurisdiction upon a lesser showing of
minimum contacts than would otherwise be required. See, e.g., Keeton v. Hustler Magazine,
Inc., 465 U.S. 770 (1984); Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783 (1984); McGee v. International Life
Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220 (1957).
24. Surely it cannot be meant to imply that a mere "claim" that sexual intercourse in
Illinois resulted in conception provides a basis for jurisdiction; the claim must at least be
plausible. See generally Sherburne County Soc. Servs. v. Kennedy, 426 N.W.2d 866 (Minn.
1988) (no jurisdiction based on single act of intercourse in forum state where conception was
the result of intercourse six months later in another state, regardless of the fact that the
mother was at all times a resident of the forum state). Yet § 2-209(a)(8) seems to reject the
requirement that the sexual intercourse within the forum actually have led to conception as
found in statutes such as Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. § 454.210 (8) (1988) and KAN. STAT. ANN. §
60-308(10) (1983).
25. See KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-308(b) (1973); Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. § 454.210(2)(a)(8)
(1988); IowA CoDE ANN. § 252B.12 (1985).
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ception within the forum state. 26 A Minnesota appellate court, for
example, upheld jurisdiction over a non-resident who had a continuing relationship with a Minnesota resident even though the act of
sexual intercourse leading to conception took place in Wisconsin, the
defendant's home state.27 The place of conception alone is not
determinative; rather, the determinative factor is whether the defendant's conduct could have foreseeable legal consequences in Illinois.
B. Personal Jurisdiction
Under the due process analysis, a state may exercise jurisdiction
over a non-resident defendant who has minimum contacts with the
state. 21 Illinois' only contribution to the minimum contacts melee was
Lichon v. Asido Chemical Co.,29 in which the First District bypassed
World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson" and Asahi Metal Industry Co. v. Superior Court31 to adopt a theory of transient jurisdiction over toxic chemicals traveling en route through Illinois to
another destination. In so doing, the court upheld the dismissal of
a third-party complaint filed by an American distributor (Asido)
against an English chemical manufacturer (Campbell), finding that
although the minimum contacts test was satisfied, due process re2
quirements were not.
Lichon filed suit against Asido for personal injuries sustained
when he came into contact with leaking drums of phorate technical,
a highly toxic chemical used in the manufacture of insecticides. 3
Asido filed a third-party complaint for contribution against Campbell, phorate's manufacturer, alleging that Campbell's negligent containment and labeling of the phorate resulted in the leaking drums,
proximately causing the plaintiff's injuries.14 Campbell was served
with summons in England, and based on Asahi, moved to dismiss
for lack of personal jurisdiction.
26. See Larsen v. Scholl, 296 N.W.2d 785 (Iowa 1980); Bouchard v. Klepacki, 357 A.2d
463 (N.H. 1976); County of Ventura v. Neice, 434 N.E.2d 907 (Ind, App. 1982) (although
the statute did not limit its scope to cases in which one party was a resident, that was true in
this case); Howells v. McKibben, 281 N.W.2d 154 (Minn. 1979).
27. Howells v. McKibben, 281 N.W.2d 154 (Minn. 1979); Brown County Family Serv.
Center v. Kahorn, 427 N.W.2d 20 (Minn. App. 1988).
28. See supra note 2.
29. 182 I1. App. 3d 672, 538 N.E.2d 613 (1st Dist. 1989).
30. 444 U.S. 286 (1980).
31. 107 S. Ct. 1026 (1987).
32. Lichon, 182 Il1. App. 3d at 685-86, 538 N.E.2d at 616.
33. Id. at 673, 538 N.E.2d at 614.
34. Id. at 673, 538 N.E.2d at 614-15.
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The First District applied the traditional two-step approach to
its jurisdictional analysis. First, the court considered whether Campbell's participation in the stream of commerce satisfied the minimum
contacts test. Notwithstanding the fact that the case involved a thirdparty complaint for indemnification against a foreign manufacturer,
the court rejected the precedential value of Asahi and relied instead
on three federal district court cases dealing with the placement of
hazardous or toxic products into the stream of commerce." Under
this line of cases, the more dangerous the product, the greater the
foreseeability of injury occurring as the product travels to its final
destination. Hence, minimum contacts can be satisfied upon a lesser
showing of contact between the forum and the defendant than would
6
be required for a non-dangerous product.
Following Justice Brennan's opinion in Asahi, the Lichon court
stated that "mere placement" of a dangerous instrumentality into
the stream of commerce is a sufficient contact between the defendant
and the forum to satisfy minimum contacts.3 7 The effect of this
theory, of course, is that in spite of World-Wide Volkswagen's
admonition to the contrary," jurisdiction travels with the inherently
dangerous product. As applied to the instant case, the court found
that Campbell's act of selling phorate technical to an American
company, which created the possibility that the phorate might cause
injury in any state in which it traveled, constituted sufficient minimum contacts with Illinois when coupled with the fact that the injury
39
allegedly occurred there.
How did the Third District justify its appointment of a chattel
as the defendant's agent for service of process? 40 It limited WorldWide Volkswagen's restrictive treatment of dangerous instrumentalities to local merchants who serve a "self-circumscribed market" and
"ordinarily [have] no control over where the buyer takes the product
after it is sold.' ' 4 Interstate distributors, on the other hand, "have
an 'interest in reaching as broad a market as' possible, and place

35. O'Neil v. Picillo, 682 F. Supp. 706 (D.R.I. 1988); Allied Towing Corp. v. Great E.
Petroleum Corp., 642 F. Supp. 1339 (E.D. Va. 1986); Violet v. Picillo, 613 F. Supp. 1563
(D.R.I. 1985).
36. Lichon, 182 Ill. App. 3d at 684-85, 538 N.E.2d at 622.
37. Id.
38. 444 U.S. 286, 295-97 (1980).
39. Lichon, 182 Il. App. 3d at 684-85, 538 N.E.2d at 622.
40. See World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 295-97.
41. Lichon, 182 Ill. App. 3d at 682, 538 N.E.2d at 620 (citing Violet v. Picillo, 613 F.
Supp. 1563, 1576 (D.R.I. 1985)).
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their products into the stream of commerce with either the subjective
intention, or objective reason to know, that their products will be
sold 'to a nation-wide market ...

in any or all states. '42

Hence,

the Third District concluded, World-Wide Volkswagen does not
insulate Campbell, who knowingly sold its dangerous product to
Asido, a nationwide distributor, from amenability to jurisdiction in
any state along the stream of commerce where the product causes
43
injury.
Having determined that Campbell had sufficient minimum contacts with Illinois to allow Illinois to exercise personal jurisdiction
over it, the court turned to the question of whether the exercise of
jurisdiction over Campbell comported with traditional notions of fair
play and substantial justice." The court weighed the burden of
requiring Campbell to litigate under a foreign judicial system against
Illinois' interest in providing a forum for a non-citizen in order to
protect its own citizens from hazardous products. The court concluded that, although Illinois' interests in this case were greater than
California's interests in Asahi, the exercise of personal jurisdiction
in Illinois would not comport with traditional notions of fair play
45
and substantial justice.

C. Subject Matter Jurisdiction
1. Jurisdiction Over Medical Peer Review Procedures
The case of Knapp v. Palos Community Hospital46 raised the
interesting issue of the scope of a circuit court's subject matter
jurisdiction over medical peer review procedures. The resolution of
this question gave rise to a doctrine of judicial deference to medical
facility judgments closely analogous to the corporate business judgment rule.
The Knapp litigation arose from the termination of several
physicians' staff privileges by Palos Community Hospital pursuant
to adverse peer review evaluations.47 The action consisted of three
consolidated appeals each raising questions related to the subject

42. Id. at 681-82, 538 N.E.2d at 620 (citing Violet, 613 F. Supp at 1576).

43. Id.
44.
45.
46.
47.

Id. at 684-85, 538 N.E.2d at 622.
Id. at 686, 538 N.E.2d at 622-23.
176 Ill. App. 3d 1012, 531 N.E.2d 989 (Ist Dist. 1988).
Id. at 1015, 531 N.E.2d at 990-91.
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matter jurisdiction of the circuit court in light of the peer review
privilege and the doctrine of judicial non-interference with hospital
medical staffing decisions.4 The Third District found that "the
overwhelming weight of authority" recognized the power, authority
and unique expertise of medical facilities to render staffing decisions
that were final and not subject to judicial review. The only exception
to this authority exists in instances of noncompliance with institutional medical requirements, in which case judicial review is limited
to compelling compliance with the prescribed procedure.4 9 The court
cited "sound reasons" for its refusal to substitute its opinion for
that of hospital authorities: the ignorance of the judiciary compared
to the expertise of hospital authorities; the presumed good faith of
hospital authorities in securing the best qualified staff; and matters
of collegiality which can be evaluated only by colleagues.50
The court also cited the Medical Studies Act, now codified as
sections 8-2101 to 8-2105 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 5' as support
for its limited review doctrine. Sections 8-2101 and 8-2102 delineate
the parameters of the terminated physician's due process entitlements.
Section 8-2101 requires that the data collected by the peer review
board be kept strictly confidential and used only for the peer review
process itself or for judicial review limited in scope to a determination
of compliance with internal procedures.5 2 Section 8-2102 bars the use
of any such peer review data as evidence in any action of any kind
in any court. 3 So defined, these two sections virtually create an
absolute peer review privilege for the medical facility and members
of its peer review board.
The court then evaluated sections 8-2101 and 8-2102 in light of
section 2b of the Medical Procedure Act.5 4 Section 2b provides
immunity for civil liability for peer review participants where these
acts do not amount to wilful and wanton misconduct.55 Finding
section 2b to be in direct conflict with sections 8-2101 and 8-2102,
and to be less specific than the latter provisions, the court refused
to carve out a wilful and wanton exception to the absolute peer

48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.

Id. at 1019, 531 N.E.2d at 992-93.
Id. at 1018-19, 531 N.E.2d at 993.
Id. at 1020-21, 531 N.E.2d at 994-95.
ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 110,
8-2101-8-2105 (1989).
Id. 1 8-2101.
Id. 8-2102.
54. Act of June 30, 1923, ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 111,
4402 (1981), repealed by Medical

Practice Act of 1987, ILL. REv.

STAT.

ch. 111,

1 4400-1--4400-63 (1989).

55. Id.
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review privilege.' 6 Accordingly, the court held that, taken in concert,
sections 8-2101 and 8-2102 render peer review data privileged, confidential, undiscoverable, and inadmissible except (1) in the peer
review process itself, (2) in any legal action related thereto unless
limited to a determination of compliance with institutional proce7
dures, or (3) upon request of the subject physician.1
2.

Public Education Labor Disputes

In another case dealing with subject matter jurisdiction, the
Illinois Supreme Court held that the Illinois Educational Labor
Relations Act"8 prohibits the circuit courts from enjoining arbitration
proceedings in the context of public education labor disputes. In
Board of Education v. Warren Township High School Federation of
Teachers, Local 504,' 9 the school district sought and received declaratory and injunctive relief against Local 504 and the Illinois Educational Labor Relations Board to prevent them from arbitrating the
grievance of a non-tenured teacher. 60 Local 504 and the labor relations
board appealed the grant of the preliminary injunction to the appellate court, and then to the Illinois Supreme Court.6'
The supreme court's analysis was based largely on Board of
Education v. Compton,62 a case decided while the Warren appeal
was pending. Compton also involved the arbitrability of a grievance
concerning a non-tenured teacher. 6 In that case, the Illinois Supreme
Court held that the Act "vests exclusive primary jurisdiction over
arbitration disputes with the Board", 64 and, thereby, "divests the
circuit courts of jurisdiction to vacate or enforce arbitration awards
in public education." 6' The Compton court offered three reasons to
substantiate its holding: (1) the Act is a comprehensive statutory
scheme creating rights and duties unknown at common law which
vest jurisdiction over unfair labor practices in the labor relations
board; 66 (2) the Act does not incorporate the enforcement mechanisms

56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.

176 I11.
App. 3d at 1025, 531 N.E.2d at 997.
Id. at 1025-26, 531 N.E.2d at 997-98.
ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 48,
1701-1721 (1989).
128 Ill.
2d 155, 538 N.E.2d 524 (1989).
Id.at 157-58, 538 N.E.2d at 525.
Id. at 158, 538 N.E.2d at 525.
123 Ill. 2d 216, 526 N.E.2d 149 (1988).
Id. at 216, 526 N.E.2d at 150.
Id. at 222, 526 N.E.2d at 152.
Id. at 217, 526 N.E.2d at 150.
Id. at 221-22, 526 N.E.2d at 152.
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of the Uniform Arbitration Act which funnels through circuit court
proceedings to compel and stay arbitrations, and vacate arbitration
awards; 67 and (3) dual jurisdiction over arbitration awards would
invite "[c]onflicting judgments from forum shopping" which would
"imperil the uniformity which the Act obviously seeks to achieve.''
Applying Compton to the instant case, the court found that the
Act preempted not only the circuit court's power to enjoin arbitrations but also its power to determine the arbitrability of a dispute. 69
To avoid disruption of the statutory scheme, the court explained that
the only matters over which the circuit court retained subject matter
jurisdiction under the Act were: (1) enforcing labor relations board
subpoenas;70 (2) enjoining strikes by educational employees which
pose a danger to public health or safety; 7' and (3) enforcing labor
relations board orders during and after an unfair labor practice
hearing. 72 Accordingly, the court found that the circuit court lacked
the subject matter jurisdiction to impose the injunctions appealed
73
from and ordered the vacation of the injunctions.
D.

Notice

In In re Petition of Village of Kildeer to Annex Certain Property, 74 the Illinois Supreme Court carved out a course-of-conductamounting-to-fraud exception to the notice requirement of the municipal annexation procedures of the Illinois Municipal Code. 7 In
1986, the Village of Kildeer attempted to annex three tracts of
privately owned land by filing three separate petitions, each initiated
by three separate municipal ordinances, before three separate circuit
court judges. 76 Each judge was unaware of the petitions pending
before the other two judges. 77 Kildeer published separate notices for
each of the three hearings in the Chicago Sun-Times which, although
a newspaper of general circulation, had limited circulation in that

67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Board of Education v. Warren High School Federation of Teachers, Local 504, 128
Ill. 2d 155, 164, 538 N.E.2d 524, 528 (1988).
70. Id. at 165, 538 N.E.2d at 528.
71. Id.

72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.

Id. at 166, 538 N.E.2d at 529.
Id. at 166-67, 538 N.E.2d at 529-30.
124 Il.2d 533, 530 N.E.2d 491 (1988).
IL. REv. STAT. ch. 24, 7-1-4 (1985).
Kildeer, 124 Il.2d at 536-38, 530 N.E.2d at 493-94.
Id. at 538, 530 N.E.2d at 493.
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area. 7 As a result, potential objectors were uninformed of the
annexations and failed to appear at the hearings. 79 Subsequently,
each judge approved the ordinance pending before him. 80Five months
later, the property owners of each respective tract of land filed
petitions to vacate each of the orders."' The property owners testified
that they had not been notified and had not consented to the
2
Each of the three petitions to vacate was granted.1
annexations.
The Illinois Supreme Court upheld the vacation orders
on two
grounds. First, each ordinance had attempted to annex a tract of
land the size of which violated the acreage limitation of section 7-12 of the Municipal Code.8" Second, the court found that although
in technical compliance with the statutory notice requirements of
section 7-1-2, Kildeer had engaged in a course of conduct calculated
to prevent objectors from discovering the legal notices, thus vitiating
the effectiveness of the notice.Y
In addition to the compliance procedures previously mentioned,
the court noted the undisputed record evidence that (1) contrary to
its practice of publishing notice in local papers, Kildeer had never
previously published notices in the Chicago Sun-Times, the circulation
of which in this particular area was only fifty-five copies per day; 5
(2) Kildeer failed to file plats of annexation in any of the courts in
which it had filed petitions;86 (3) officials of Kildeer had personal
knowledge of the identity of at least one landowner but nevertheless
failed to inform him of the annexation;8 7 (4) an agent of Kildeer
attended public meetings at which she learned that the affected
property owners were unaware of the pending annexations but,
pursuant to instructions, refrained from providing pertinent information to either the property owners or appropriate government
officials;88 and (5) objectors were compelled to resort to Freedom of
Information Act requests because the Village of Kildeer refused to
release relevant documentation upon request.8 9 The court character78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.

Id. at 538, 548, 530 N.E.2d at 493, 498.
Id. at 538, 530 N.E.2d at 493.
Id.
Id. at 539, 530 N.E.2d at 494.
Id. at 537, 530 N.E.2d at 493.
Id. at 546, 530 N.E.2d at 497 (referring to ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 24,
Kildeer, 124 Ill. 2d at 550, 530 N.E.2d at 499.
Id. at 548, 530 N.E.2d at 498.
Id. at 549, 530 N.E.2d at 498.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 550-51, 530 N.E.2d at 499.

HeinOnline -- 14 S. Ill. U. L.J. 712 1989-1990

1

7-1-2 (1985)).

1990]

Civil Procedure

ized this conduct as "egregious" 9 and, although in technical compliance with the statute, "calculated to prevent objectors from
discovering the legal notices." 9' Finding no abuse of the circuit court's
discretion, the court affirmed the orders vacating the annexation
petitions .92
III. PLEADINGS
A. Stating a Cause of Action for Psychiatric Malpractice: The
Duty to Warn
The case of Eckhardt v. Kirts93 raised the interesting issue of
the scope of a psychiatrist's duty to warn a third party who is injured
by an act of a patient undergoing psychiatric treatment. The complaint alleged that Joyce Eckhardt, a psychiatric patient of Dr. Kirts,
shot and killed her husband while he was sleeping in his bedroom
and that Kirts's failure to warn Mr. Eckhardt that he was one of
his wife's three potential victims increased the likelihood of the
homicide. The court framed the issue as the extent to which Dr.
Kirts owed a duty to warn the potential victims of Mrs. Eckhardt's
violent propensities.Y
The plaintiff argued that Kirts owed a duty to the decedent
because, although his specific homicide could not have been predicted, "he was a member of a readily identifiable group of three
potential victims against whom Joyce Eckhardt would reasonably
and foreseeably direct her violent acts." 9 Since this argument raised
an issue of first impression for Illinois courts, the plaintiff relied
heavily on the California case of Tarasoff v. Regents of the University
of California,9 which held a therapist liable for failing to warn a
victim of threats on which his patient eventually acted.9 Tarasoff
created an exception to the general rule that no one owes a duty to
control the conduct of another because, in that case, "the defendant

90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
health
95.
96.
97.

Id. at 549, 530 N.E.2d at 498.
Id. at 550, 530 N.E.2d at 499.
Id. at 551, 530 N.E.2d at 499.
179 Ill. App. 3d 863, 534 N.E.2d 1339 (2d Dist. 1989).
Id. at 869, 534 N.E.2d at 1342. So framed, the issue and its resolution extended to all
care providers and hospitals, not only to physicians.
Id.
17 Cal. 3d 425, 551 P.2d 334, 131 Cal. Rptr. 14 (1976).
Eckhardt, 179 111.App. 3d at 869, 534 N.E.2d at 1342.
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was the known, specifically foreseeable and identifiable victim of the
patient's threats.''98
The Eckhardt court noted that in two recent decisions,9 the
Illinois Supreme Court refused to impose upon health care providers
a duty to third parties who had neither a direct nor special relationship with the health care provider.'0 The court also noted that other
jurisdictions have declined to extend the physician's duty to warn to
the public at large or to an indeterminate class of potential plaintiffs.10' Finally, the court recognized the strong public policy underlying the confidentiality of the patient-therapist relationship and the
10 2
disruptive therapeutic consequences of routine disclosures.
Against these concerns, the court considered the therapist's duty
to warn when "a patient poses a serious danger of violence to the
foreseeable victim."' 13 Foreseeability, the court counseled, must not
be based on predictions of mere possibilities, but rather, on "what
the reasonably prudent person would have foreseen as likely to

happen."

14

Based on these considerations, the court found that a cause of
action predicated upon a therapist's duty to warn must include the
following three elements: First, the patient's threats of violence must
be specific. Second, the threats must be directed at a specific and
identified victim. Third, a direct or special relationship must exist
between the patient and the health care provider. 0 5 The court concluded by observing that greater expansion of the duty to warn could
impose limitless responsibility and an unacceptably severe burden on
health care providers who render therapeutic assistance under circum-

98. Id. at 872, 534 N.E.2d at 1344 (citing Thompson v. County of Alameda, 27 Cal. 3d
741, 751-52, 614 P.2d 728, 733, 167 Cal. Rptr. 70, 75 (1980)).
99. Estate of Johnson v. Condell Mem. Hosp., 119 Il. 2d 496, 520 N.E.2d 37 (1988)
(hospital was found to have no duty to unknown third parties who were the victims of a
police chase of an escaped patient); Kirk v. Michael Reese Hosp. & Med. Center, 117 Ill.
2d
507, 513 N.E.2d 387 (1987) (psychiatrist was found to have no liability for injuries sustained
by a passenger in a car driven by a patient who consumed alcohol which, in combination with
medication prescribed by the psychiatrist, resulted in the patient's impaired driving ability).
100. Eckhardt, 179 Ill. App. 3d at 871, 534 N.E.2d at 1343 (citing Kirk, 117 Ill. 2d at 531,
513 N.E.2d at 398).
101. Id. at 871, 534 N.E.2d at 1343-44 (citing Renslow v. Mennonite Hosp., 67 Il.2d 348,
367 N.E.2d 1250 (1967)).
102. Id. at 872, 534 N.E.2d at 1344 (citing Thompson v. County of Alameda, 27 Cal. 3d
741, 752, 614 P.2d 728, 734, 167 Cal. Rptr. 70, 76 (1980)).
103. Id. (citing Thompson, 27 Cal. 3d at 752, 614 P.2d at 734, 167 Cal. Rptr. at 76).
104. Id. at 870, 534 N.E.2d at 1343.
105. Id. at 872, 534 N.E.2d at 1344.

HeinOnline -- 14 S. Ill. U. L.J. 714 1989-1990

1990]

Civil Procedure

stances in which "[hiuman behavior is simply too unpredictable and
the field of psychotherapy presently too inexact. . .. ",06
B.

Statute of Limitations

In Johnson v. Johnson,1°7 the United States District Court for
the Northern District of Illinois was called upon to resolve an issue
of first impression under Illinois law: Whether psychological suppression, a form of forgetting, is the equivalent of lack of awareness
for purposes of applying the delayed discovery doctrine.
The plaintiff alleged that although she was over 30 years old at
the time the complaint was filed, she had until that time suppressed
all memory of alleged sexual molestation by her father and corresponding psychological neglect by her mother until psychotherapeutic
treatment enabled her "to begin to remember, perceive and understand the nature and scope of her injuries and their causal connection
to Defendant's [sic] earlier acts."'' 0
The defendants filed a motion to dismiss, which was subsequently
treated as a motion for summary judgment, on the grounds that the
complaint was time-barred. 0 9 In an Erie-style analysis, the court
determined that Illinois would have applied its statute of limitations
and discovery rule to this case." 0 The court looked to the rulings of
other state courts and found that among the few courts that have
resolved the specific issue, the holdings are in conflict."' The cases
divide the suppression/statute of limitations issue into two categories:
(1) cases in which the plaintiff knew of the sexual assault at or
before majority but had not yet become aware of the consequences
thereof; and (2) cases, such as this one, in which the plaintiff claims
to have suppressed all knowledge and awareness of the assault until
2
shortly before filing suit."

106. Id. at 874, 534 N.E.2d at 1345.
107. 701 F. Supp. 1363 (N.D. Il. 1989).
108. Id. at 1364.
109. Id. at 1370.
110. Id.
111. Id. at 1367.
112. Id. Wisconsin has applied the discovery rule to both categories of cases. Hammer v.
Hammer, 142 Wis. 2d 257, 418 N.E.2d 23, 25 (1987), review denied, 144 Wis. 2d 953, 428
N.E.2d 552 (1988). California and Montana have applied the discovery rule to the second
category of cases but have declined to apply it to the first category. DeRose v. Carswell, 196
Cal. App. 3d 1011, 242 Cal. Rptr. 368 (1987); E.W. & D.W. v. D.C.H., 754 P.2d 817 (Mont.
1988). Several Washington cases had declined to apply the discovery rule to either category.
Tyson v. Tyson, 107 Wash. 2d 72, 727 P.2d 226 (1986); Raymond v. Ingram, 47 Wash. App.
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To determine Illinois' approach, the court looked to the analysis
in Rozny v. Marnul,"3 which balanced the problems of stale proof
against prejudice to the plaintiff. That court stated that the balance
should be "founded on reason and common sense" and "developed
to further justice." '" 4 According to Rozny, Illinois courts have applied
the discovery rule in numerous contexts, using a case-by-case approach which places a higher value on equitable considerations than
on proof problems." 5 Thus, the Johnson court concluded that in
cases of adult incest survivors who allegedly have no conscious
memory of sexual abuse, Illinois would toll the statute of limitations
until the victim knew or should have known that injury was caused
by the wrongful acts of another." 6 That point in time, the court
concluded, was to be determined on a case-by-case basis." 7 Finding
a factual dispute as to when the plaintiff first knew or should have
known of the injury, the court denied the defendants' motion for
summary judgment."'
The somewhat peculiar case of McIntyre v. Christ Hospital,"9
raised the seminal question of when, for statute of limitations purposes, a man reasonably should know that he does not, did not, and
will not have descended testicles due to the alleged wrongful acts of
another. The plaintiff contended that he never knew nor had reason
to suspect that he did not have testicles until, at the age of 20, a
surgeon informed him that he had, but should not have had, undescended testicles. The plaintiff alleged that the defendant, who had
performed a hernia operation on the plaintiff when the latter was
age 6, should have diagnosed and treated the undescended testicles
problem at that time.
In his motion for summary judgment, the defendant hernia
surgeon, who had last examined the plaintiff fourteen years earlier,

781, 737 P.2d 314 (1987); Kaiser v. Milliman, 50 Wash. App. 235, 747 P.2d 1130 (1988). But
the cases were subsequently superseded by statute. WAsH. REv. CODE § 144 (1988). Despite
the differences in outcome, each forum adopted the same analytical approach of weighing the
risk of stale or fraudulent claims against the unfairness of barring meritorious claims. Johnson,
701 F. Supp. at 1367-68.
113. 43 Ill. 2d 54, 70, 250 N.E.2d 656, 664 (1969).
114. Johnson, 701 F. Supp at 1369 (quoting Fure v. Sherman Hosp., 64 Ill.
App. 3d 259,
380 N.E.2d 1376 (2d Dist. 1978)).
115. Id.
116. Id. at 1369-70.
117. Id. at 1370.
118. Id.
119. 181 Ill.
App. 3d 76, 536 N.E.2d 882 (1st Dist. 1989).
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argued that the plaintiff's cause of action was time-barred. 2° The
defendant cited the plaintiff's deposition testimony that his lack of
complete genitalia was as noticeable as "having three fingers,"
causing him purposely to conceal himself in the high school locker
room.' 2 ' Hence, the defendant contended, through the use of reasonable diligence and inquiry, the plaintiff should have been aware of
his condition long before he brought this action.12 The circuit court
granted summary judgment for the defendant and the plaintiff ap23
pealed.
The appellate court found, given the nature of the injury claimed
by the plaintiff, that it could not hold as a matter of law when the
plaintiff knew or reasonably should have known that his condition
was caused by the defendant's allegedly wrongful conduct.' 2 ' For
summary judgment purposes, whether the plaintiff knew or should
have known of the injury and its cause were genuine issues of fact
to be determined by the jury. 12 Characterizing the question as
"close," the court held that the statute of limitations issue should
be resolved by the jury. 26 In the final analysis, it is impossible to
quarrel with the result reached by the appellate court. It may be
appropriate, indeed, to hold malpractice plaintiffs to a higher standard than the physicians who attend them. The rule that emerges
from this case may be stated simply: ignorance of the law is no
excuse, but ignorance of medicine is excusable in all physicians and
in some patients.
C.

Standing: The Power of the Public Guardian

In In re Estate of Burgeson,'27 Patrick T. Murphy, the public
guardian for Cook County, lost a skirmish to enlarge the power of
his office but made significant inroads in the war against attorney
misconduct. Murphy had attempted to challenge and vacate two
orders entered during probate of the estate of Zella Burgeson, a
former Guardian ward. One order closed the Burgeson Estate and
included an award of fees to attorney Sheldon Kirschner who had

120.
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.

Id. at 80, 536 N.E.2d at 884.
Id. at 82, 536 N.E.2d at 886.
Id.
Id.at 80, 536 N.E.2d at 884-85.
Id. at 82, 536 N.E.2d at 886.
Id. at 81, 536 N.E.2d at 885.
Id. at 82, 536 N.E.2d at 886.
125 Il1. 2d 477, 532 N.E.2d 825 (1988).
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been charged with Burgeson's care during the two years prior to her
death. The second order included a judicial finding that Kirschner
committed no improprieties in his care of the deceased.'2
In November 1982, Burgeson, an elderly woman, signed over a
broad power of attorney to Kirschner after it became apparent that
she no longer could care for herself. 29 Kirschner hired a "companion" to live with and care for Burgeson, but it later became apparent
that Burgeson was not being well cared for. For example, by 1984,
Kirschner had received several letters from Burgeson's neighbors
reporting that,
Burgeson was wandering in the lobby naked, had urinated in the
lobby and that the odors emanating from her apartment were
overwhelming .... [Hier ... apartment ... was in a shocking
state of disarray-the sink, counter and tables were littered with
dirty dishes, garbage containers overflowed, the bathtub was filled
with standing dirty water and the toilet had not been cleaned in
some time. 30
Building residents also complained that Kirschner had neither
responded to their letters nor taken corrective action to aid Burgeson.
In July 1984, the companion was arrested for attempting to cash a
check forged from Burgeson's account. Two months previously, the
companion allegedly cashed $4,000 in unauthorized checks from the
same account. 3 ' Subsequent investigation revealed that Burgeson was
13 2
indeed kept in a neglected and virtually disabled state.
Due to these circumstances, Burgeson became a temporary ward
of the Office of the Public Guardian. Murphy afid Kirschner both
sought to be named as her plenary guardian. This dispute ended
when Burgeson died, at which time her brother, John Hounson, was
appointed executor and retained Kirschner as counsel for her estate.
Undaunted, Murphy filed a petition for the appointment of a special
administrator to investigate the allegations of Kirschner's misconduct
and, additionally, initiated disciplinary proceedings against Kirschner
with the Attorney Registration and Disciplinary Commission (ARDC).
An administrator was appointed and a preliminary investigation
instigated, but the investigation was discontinued when Hounson and

128.
129.
130.
131.
132.

Id. at 479-80, 532 N.E.2d at 825.
Id. at 480, 532 N.E.2d at 826.
Id.at 481, 532 N.E.2d at 826.
Id.
Id.
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other beneficiaries of the estate petitioned to remove the special
administrator.'
Kirschner then filed a petition to close the estate and approve
the final account. Murphy received no notice of the estate's closing
even though he had requested it because Kirschner told the court
that notice need not be given. Murphy discovered that the estate had
been closed when the ARDC informed him, three months later, that
his complaint against Kirschner had been dismissed. Murphy then
filed a section 2-1401 motion to vacate the two orders.'3 4 The trial
court denied the motion and the appellate court affirmed.'35
On appeal, the state supreme court agreed that once discharged,
a former guardian lacked "injury in fact to a legally recognized
interest" 13 6 and, therefore, lacked standing to protest the pre-death
treatment of the deceased. However, the court did find that as an
officer of the court, Murphy had responsibly executed his duty to
bring allegations of Kirschner's misconduct before the ARDC. The
court expressed great concerns about these allegations3 7 and admonished the ARDC to thoroughly investigate the matter.
IV.

DISCOVERY

In Willing v. St. Joseph Hospital,3 ' the First District further
defined what is discoverable and what is not in the medical peer
review process. The case involved a medical malpractice claim in
which the plaintiff requested the following documents:
1. Any and all materials maintained on Dr. Kitt, including but
not limited to his entire credentials file, applications for appointment
to staff, applications for specific privileges, references, transcripts,
reappraisals, evaluations, recommendations, initial privileges,
restrictions to privileges, revocation of privileges, letters of resignation
or withdrawal.
2. The written criteria or standards which must be satisfied for
granting each category of privilege granted to Dr. Kitt.
3. Any and all written rules; regulations, policies or procedures
for medical doctors on staff for the departments of surgery, plastic
surgery and otolaryngology.13

133.
134.
135.
136.
137.
138.
139.

Id. at 482, 532 N.E.2d at
Id. at 483-84, 532 N.E.2d
Id. at 484, 532 N.E.2d at
Id. at 486, 532 N.E.2d at
Id. at 488, 532 N.E.2d at
176 Il.App. 3d 737, 531
Id. at 739-40, 531 N.E.2d

826-27.
at 827.
827.
827.
829.
N.E.2d 824 (1st Dist. 1988).
at 826.
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The defendant health care providers refused to produce the documents, claiming they were privileged under sections 8-2101 and 82102 of the Medical Studies Act.' 40 The court granted the plaintiff's
motion for a rule to show cause and held the defendants' attorney
14
in contempt. 1
The court explained that the purpose of section 8-2101 is to
protect the integrity of the peer review process by enabling health
care professionals to engage in candid and critical evaluations of
their peers without fear of reprisal.' 42 As such, section 8-2101 materials are subject to several levels of protection. First, section 8-2101
renders confidential the content of peer review sessions and documents employed therein but not actions taken as a result of such
sessions. 43 Consequently, changes in status and restrictions of privileges are discoverable because such information discloses the resolution but not the content of peer review sessions.'" Second, to
confirm that distinctions are properly made, a defendant physician
or hospital may request that the court screen each document before
its release. 45 Third, even if certain information is found to be
discoverable, it must still overcome the obstacles posed by the rules
of evidence before it is admissible at trial.'"6
Based on this analysis, the court found that the information
requested by the plaintiffs either pertained to matters anteceding or
preceding the peer review process and as such were discoverable.
Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's order to produce
the requested documents.
V.

SANCTIONS

Under Illinois law, sanctions are presently available under two
sets of circumstances. First, sanctions are available under section 2611 of the Code of Civil Procedure (now Supreme Court Rule 137)
if a party or its counsel makes an untrue statement in a pleading or
motion. 47 Second, sanctions are available under Supreme Court Rule
219(c) if a party or counsel violates discovery rules.'"

140.
141.
142.
143.
144.
145.
146.
147.

ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, 1 8o2101, 8-2102 (1989).
Willing, 176 111.App. 3d at 740, 531 N.E.2d at 826.
Id. at 741, 531 N.E.2d at 827.
Id. at 742, 531 N.E.2d at 827.
Id. at 744, 531 N.E.2d at 829.
Id.
Id.
ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 110, 2-611.1 (1989). The statute provides in pertinent part:
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A. Sanctions Under Section 2-611 and Illinois Supreme Court
Rule 137
Section 2-611 has been in effect since 1986 and represents a
substantial reworking of its predecessor, which applied only to pleadings and parties (not their attorneys) upon a showing of bad faith
and limited available sanctions to actual expenses and attorneys
fees. 49 Since the new section 2-611 substantially altered prior law, a
number of cases have held that it could not be applied retroactively
to actions filed before its effective date. 50 Thus, appellate courts
rarely were called upon to apply the new statute in its first years of
existence.
In Beno v. McNew,' 5' decided during the past survey year, the
Second District provided a fine, single-paragraph summary of section
2-611:
Section 2-611 of the Code requires that an attorney sign pleadings
and other papers filed with the court as a certification that the
attorney has read the document, made a reasonable inquiry into its
basis, and believes that it is well grounded in fact and law. (Citation
omitted). Pleadings and other papers filed in violation of section 2611 shall subject the party, the party's attorney, or both to an

[A]llegations and denials, made without reasonable cause and found to be untrue,
shall subject the party pleading them ... to the payment of reasonable expenses,
actually incurred by the other party ... together with a reasonable attorneys' fees,
to be summarily taxed by the court upon motion made within 30 days of the
judgment or dismissal.
Id.
148. Id. ch. 1lOA, I 219(c). This rule provides, in pertinent part:
If a party, or any person at the instance of or in collusion with a party, unreasonably
refuses to comply with any provision of [the discovery rules of this court] or fails
to comply with any order entered under these rules, the court, on motion, may
enter, in addition to remedies elsewhere specifically provided, such orders as are
just, including, among others, the following:
(i) that further proceedings be stayed until the order or rule is complied with;
(ii) that the offending party be debarred from filing any other pleading relating
to any issue to which the refusal or failure relates;
(iii) that he be debarred from maintaining any particular claim, counterclaim,
third-party complaint, or defense relating to that issue;
(iv) that a witness be barred from testifying concerning that issue;
(v) that, as to claims or defenses asserted in any pleading to which that issue is
material, a judgment by default be entered against the offending party or that his
action be dismissed with or without prejudice; or
(vi) that any portion of his pleadings relating to that issue be stricken and, if
thereby made appropriate, judgment be entered as to that issue.
149. Id. ch. 110, 1 2-611.
150. Safeway Ins. Co. v. Graham, 188 Il. App. 3d 608, 613, 544 N.E.2d 1117, 1120 (1st
Dist. 1989).
151. 186 Ill. App. 3d 359, 542 N.E.2d 533 (2d Dist. 1989).
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appropriate sanction which may include an order to pay the other
party the amount of reasonable expenses incurred because of the
filing of the pleading, including reasonable attorneys fees. (Citations
omitted). The purpose of section 2-611 is to prevent a litigant from
abusing the judicial process by penalizing the party who brings a
vexatious or harassing action without legal foundation or an action
that is based on false statements. (Citations omitted). The party
seeking relief has the burden of proof and must establish both that
the challenged allegations were untrue and that they were made

without reasonable cause .... 12
In Washington v. Allstate Insurance Co.,"' the First District
considered an award of $27,182.00 in attorney's fees and costs to
the defendant under section 2-611 after the circuit court granted a
directed verdict for the defendant. '54 The plaintiffs had sued for
breach of contract following the defendant's refusal to pay an
insurance claim on an automobile, but failed to establish that they
actually owned or had an insurable interest in the car."
In upholding the order, the court stressed that sanctions against
the parties rather than their attorney were appropriate because the
unreasonable allegations were of fact rather than law. The court
found that this was a case "in which an attorney must rely almost
exclusively on his client for the facts" and that the attorney's reliance
on his client's statement was not clearly unreasonable.1 6 This circumstance was contrasted to situations in which "a motion was unsupported by existing law rather than the facts," in which case it would
be clear that the attorney, not the client, should bear the burden of
the sanctions.'7
8 another panel of
In In re Caruso,"1
the First District upheld
sanctions against an attorney for failing to conduct reasonable investigations into allegations made about a child's putative father. In
a child custody fight, the mother alleged that the petitioner father
was not the child's real father.5 9 This allegation was refuted by
several facts: the petitioner and respondent had lived together at the
time of the child's conception; petitioner was present at the child's
152. Id. at 364-65, 542 N.E.2d at 536.
153. 175 Ill. App. 3d 574, 529 N.E.2d 1086 (1st Dist. 1988).
154. Id. at 576, 574 N.E.2d at 1087.

155.
156.
157.
158.
159.

Id.
Id.
Id.
185
Id.

at 577, 574 N.E.2d at
at 581, 574 N.E.2d at
at 580, 574 N.E.2d at
II1.App. 3d 739, 542
at 741, 542 N.E.2d at

1087.
1090.
1090.
N.E.2d 375 (1st Dist. 1989).
376.
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delivery with respondent's consent; petitioner was named as the father
on the child's birth certificate which was certified by respondent as
true; and blood tests showed petitioner to be the father with ninetynine percent probability.160
The appellate court held that the circuit court was within its
discretion in finding that the attorney had not made a reasonable
inquiry into the facts. The court asserted that the attorney's professional obligation of loyalty to the client did not override his "professional duty to promptly dismiss a baseless lawsuit, even over the
objection of the client, when the attorney learns that the client has
no case.' ' 6' Thus, in such cases, sanctions against both attorney and
client are appropriate.
Taken together, Washington and Caruso illustrate the types of
difficult questions posed by section 2-611. For example, how does
one distinguish between a weak factual case and a baseless one? How
much skepticism of a client is required and how will this attitude
affect the attorney/client relationship? Illinois courts have yet to
provide a specific test of what a reasonable inquiry is, and perhaps
nothing more than a set of general guidelines is possible.
Interestingly, both Washington and Caruso relied on federal
precedent under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11, which served as
the model for the drafters of section 2-611.162 On August 1, 1989,
section 2-611 was replaced by Supreme Court Rule 137 which essentially adopts the gist of Federal Rule 11 and requires that the person
signing court documents, whether attorney or pro se applicant, certify
that "he has read the pleading, motion, or other paper; and, that
to the best of his knowledge, information, and belief formed after
reasonable inquiry it is well grounded in fact and is warranted by
existing law or a good-faith argument for the extension, modification,
or reversal of existing law, and that it is not interposed for any
improper purpose ....

'163

Rule 137 preempts all matters sought to be covered under the
previous section 2-611.1 6Rule 137, however, differs from section 2-

160. Id. at 741, 542 N.E.2d at 377.

161. Id. at 744, 542 N.E.2d at 379.
162. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 110, 2-611 Historical and Practice Notes (Smith-Hurd 1987). In
a recent development, the United States Supreme Court held that lawyers who file frivolous
actions may still be subject to Rule 11 sanctions even after the actions have been voluntarily
dismissed. Cooter & Gell v. Hartmarx, 110 S. Ct. 2447 (1990).
163. ILL. REv. STAT. ch. IIOA, 137 (1989).
164. Id. See ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 110A, 137 Committee Comments (Smith-Hurd 1989).
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611 in two respects. First, Rule 137 allows for, but does not require,
the imposition of sanctions.' 65 Second, where an imposition of sanctions is found to be appropriate, Rule 137 requires the trial judge to
"set forth with specificity the reasons and basis of any sanction in
a separate written order."' 66 As Supreme Court Rule 137 is new, no
case law has yet to interpret it. However, since it is patterned after
Federal Rule 11, one would suspect that the federal decisions construing Rule 11 would provide adequate guidance.
B.

Sanctions Under Rule 219(c)

Illinois Supreme Court Rule 219(c) provides that a circuit court
may issue a wide range of sanctions, including dismissal, for an
unreasonable failure to comply with a discovery order. 67 Several
recent appellate cases illustrate the range of Rule 219(c) sanctions in
contradistinction to the significantly different approaches imposed
under section 2-611.
In Mueller v. Insurance Benefit Administrators,Inc. ,' a lawsuit
marked by a series of "affronts and vendettas" by the attorneys
toward each other, the defendant obtained a court order scheduling
the plaintiff's deposition for October 15, 1985. The plaintiff, who
previously had failed to appear at two scheduled depositions, appeared on October 15 but his attorney did not. The plaintiff's
attorney previously had called defense counsel to request a postponement, but defense counsel refused, referring to the court order
and stating that everyone would wait until the plaintiff's attorney
arrived. The plaintiff's attorney responded that defense counsel could
"wait until the cows come home.' ' 6 9
The defendant sought sanctions under Rule 219(c), and was
awarded fees and costs of $625.00 to be paid by the plaintiff
himself. 70 When the plaintiff did not pay, claiming that he could
not afford to, his complaint was dismissed. The plaintiff appealed
the dismissal.
The First District noted that the purpose of Rule 219(c) sanctions
is to "accomplish discovery rather than inflict punishment'""' and

165.
166.
167.
168.
169.
170.
171.

ILL. REV. STAT. ch. IIOA,
Id.
Id. 219(c).
175 I1. App. 3d 587, 529
Id.at 594, 529 N.E.2d at
Id. at 598, 529 N.E.2d at
Id.at 598, 529 N.E.2d at

137 (1989).

N.E.2d 1126 (1st Dist. 1988).
1129.
1132.
1133.
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are appropriate only where "the offending party's conduct is characterized by a deliberate and pronounced disregard for the discovery
rules and for the court.' 72 Although the court described the conduct
of the plaintiff's attorney on October 15 as "unprofessional," and
stated that it "condemned" his telephone "diatribe," it reversed the
circuit court's order,'" stating that it was unreasonable for defense
counsel to continue the day-long vigil after the telephone conversation. The court also stressed that, despite his unprofessional behavior,
plaintiff's attorney had a "good faith opinion" that the plaintiff's
deposition should not be taken until a pending motion to dismiss
74
had been ruled on.
In Kubian v. Labinsky,7 1 the circuit court dismissed a malpractice action after repeated failures by the plaintiff's counsel to identify
expert witnesses and to respond to interrogatories. Although the First
District stated that an imposition of sanctions would be disturbed
only if found to be an abuse of discretion, and that it sympathized
"with the very able trial judge, whose fair and patient attempts to
compel discovery were repeatedly frustrated by unexplained
noncom176
pliance with his orders," it nonetheless reversed.
The court explained that although "sanctions were clearly necessary and proper," the circuit court should have invoked "progressively harsher sanctions" short of dismissal, using dismissal only as
a last resort.' 77 The court suggested that it might not have objected
to a less harsh sanction, but that "the sanction of dismissal with
1 78
prejudice was too severe for an initial sanction in this case.'
The lessons of Mueller and Kubian clearly illustrate the differences between sanctions imposed under section 2-611 (now Rule 137)
and Rule 219(c). The purpose of section 2-611 sanctions is to punish
and deter wrongful conduct by attorneys and parties. The purpose
of Rule 219(c) sanctions is to move cases through discovery to trial.
A dismissal order, by definition, precludes a trial, and although it
may help clear a court's docket, it does not further the true purpose
of the rule. Thus, dismissal orders are to be used only as a last
resort; they are not to be used in every case of unprofessional attorney
conduct.
172.
173.
174.
175.
176.
177.
178.

Id.
Id. at 598-99, 529 N.E.2d
Id. at 598-99, 529 N.E.2d
178 I11.App. 3d 191, 533
Id. at 201, 533 N.E.2d at
Id. at 202, 533 N.E.2d at
Id.

at 1129.
at 1130.
N.E.2d 22 (1st Dist. 1988).
28.
28.
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JUDGMENTS

Voluntary Dismissals
During the survey period, the Illinois Supreme Court handed

down two significant decisions based on its previous ruling in O'Connell v. St. Francis Hospital.7 9 Martinez v. Erickson, s0 held that
O'Connell was to be given retroactive application. Gibellina v.

Handley8 ' held that it was not. Here's how this Push-Me-Pull-You
duo came to be:

In O'Connell, the supreme court examined the interrelationship
among the diligence requirement of Rule 103(b),182 the voluntary
dismissal provision of section 2-1009 of the Illinois Code of Civil
Procedure,' 3 and the one-year time expansion accorded section 21009 dismissals pursuant to section 13-217 of the Code. 8 4 The O'Con112 111.2d 273, 492 N.E.2d 1322 (1986).
127 I11.2d 112, 535 N.E.2d 853 (1989).
127 I11.
2d 122, 535 N.E.2d 858 (1989).
ILL. REV. STAT. ch. IIOA,
103(b) (1989) provides:
(b) Dismissal for Lack of Diligence. If the plaintiff fails to exercise reasonable
diligence to obtain service prior to the expiration of the applicable statute of
limitations, the action as a whole or as to any unserved defendant may be dismissed
without prejudice. If the failure to exercise reasonable diligence to obtain service
occurs after the expiration of the applicable statute of limitations, the dismissal shall
be with prejudice. In either case the dismissal may be made on the application of
any defendant or on the court's own motion.
183. Id. ch. 110, 1 2-1009(a). This paragraph provides:
The plaintiff may, at any time before trial or hearing begins, upon notice to each
party who has appeared or such party's attorney, and upon payment of costs,
dismiss his or her action or any part thereof as to any defendant, without prejudice,
by order filed in the cause. Thereafter the plaintiff may dismiss, only on terms fixed
by the court (1) upon filing a stipulation to that effect signed by the defendant, or
(2) on motion specifying the ground for dismissal, which shall be supported by
affidavit on other proof. After a counterclaim has been pleaded by a defendant no
dismissal may be had as to the defendant except by the defendant's consent.
For a good overview of voluntary dismissals in Illinois, see Johnston & Johnston, Voluntary
Dismissals in Illinois, 9 N. ILL. U.L.R. 515 (1989).
184. Id. ch 110, 1 13-217 provides:
Reversal or dismissal. In the actions specified in Article XIII of this Act or any
other act or contract where the time for commencing an action is limited, if judgment
is entered for the plaintiff but reversed on appeal, or if there is a verdict in favor
of the plaintiff and, upon a motion in arrest of judgment, the judgment is entered
against the plaintiff, or the action is voluntarily dismissed by the plaintiff, or the
action is dismissed for want of prosecution, or the action is dismissed by a United
States District Court for lack of jurisdiction, then, whether or not the time limitation
for bringing such action expires during the pendency of such action, the plaintiff,
his or her heirs, executors or administrators may commence a new action within one
year or within the remaining period of limitation, whichever is greater, after such
judgment is reversed or entered against the plaintiff, or after the action is voluntarily
dismissed by the plaintiff, or the action is dismissed for want of prosecution, or the
action is dismissed by a United States District Court for want of prosecution, or
the action is dismissed by a United States District Court for lack of jurisdiction.
179.
180.
181.
182.
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nell plaintiff filed suit on the last day of the statute of limitations
and then failed to effect service on the defendants for nine months.
The defendants moved for dismissal pursuant to Rule 103(b), and in
response, the plaintiff voluntarily dismissed his action pursuant to
section 2-1009. The trial judge allowed the plaintiff's voluntary
dismissal without taking any action on the defendants' Rule 103(b)
motion. The plaintiff then refiled his action in accordance with
section 13-217 and served the defendants within ten days. The defendants again moved for dismissal under Rule 103(b). The trial
judge denied the motion but certified the question. On appeal, the
defendants argued that the reasonable diligence requirement of Rule
103(b) applied to both the original and the refiled complaints.
The supreme court found a conflict between its Rule 103(b) and
Code sections 2-1009 and 13-217 in that the legislative enactments
were unduly infringing upon the judiciary's authority to "discharge
its duty fairly and expeditiously."' 18 Finding that Rule 103(b) prevailed over the legislative enactments, the court held that a Rule
103(b) motion, if filed first, must be heard on its merits prior to a
motion for voluntary dismissal under section 2- 1009.186 As applied
to the instant case, the court held that a plaintiff's right to voluntarily
dismiss and refile a complaint is subject to the reasonable diligence
requirement of Rule 103(b) and, thus, the circuit court may consider
the efforts, or lack thereof, of the plaintiff to serve both the original
and the refiled complaints. 87
Martinez v. Erickson'88 raised the issue of whether O'Connell
should be given retrospective or prospective application. In Martinez,
the plaintiff had filed and subsequently dismissed several medical
malpractice suits without attempting service of process. Pursuant to
section 13-217, the plaintiff then refiled a single action joining all of
the defendants from the previously dismissed actions. All defendants
were served within three weeks, and all defendants moved to dismiss
pursuant to Illinois Supreme Court Rule 103(b) based on the plaintiff's lack of service in the original suits.
On appeal, the supreme court held that a determination of the
plaintiff's diligence in serving both the original and the refiled
complaints may be made retroactively. 89 Based on this analysis, the

185.
186.
187.
188.
189.

O'Connell, 112 Il.2d at 282, 492 N.E.2d at 1327.
Id. at 283, 492 N.E.2d at 1327.
Id.
127 Il1. 2d 112, 535 N.E.2d 853 (1989).
Id. at 117-18, 535 N.E.2d at 857.
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court remanded the case to the circuit court to determine the extent
to which the plaintiff had complied with the Rule 103(b) requirements
upon refiling.190
Gibellina v. Handley,19 was the first in a long line of cases
successfully to extend O'Connell's holdings to other dispositive motions.192 The ruling in Gibellina, however, was given prospective
application only.
Gibellina was the consolidation of two medical malpractice cases
and one products liability case. In each case, the plaintiffs failed to
disclose their expert witnesses, who were eventually barred from
testifying at trial. 93 In each case, the defendants moved for summary
judgment on the grounds that the plaintiffs would be unable to prove
their case without the aid of expert testimony. Subsequently, each
plaintiff filed a section 2-1009 motion for voluntary dismissal. The
motions were denied in favor of the defendants' motions for summary
judgment. The appellate court reversed on the ground that the circuit
court did not have the discretion to rule on the summary judgments
in advance of the motions for voluntary dismissal.
On appeal to the Illinois Supreme Court, the issue was whether
a potentially dispositive motion could be heard prior to a motion
for voluntary dismissal. The defendants argued that the court should
restrict the scope of section 2-1009 to that of Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 41(a), which permits a plaintiff to take a voluntary dismissal as of right only in advance of the filing of an answer or
responsive motion by the defendant. 94 The plaintiffs argued that

190. Id. at 122, 535 N.E.2d at 858. But see Johnston & Johnston, supra note 183; Johnston
& Johnston, The Vagueness of Illinois Supreme Court Rule 103(b) (1989) (unpublished
manuscript available from the authors at the John Marshall Law School).
191. 127 111.2d 122, 137, 535 N.E.2d 858 (1989).
192. See Mancuso v. Alda Blanche Beach, 149 Il. App. 3d 188, 500 N.E.2d 589 (1st Dist.
1986) (attempted to extend the rule to motions to dismiss for failure to state a cause of
action); Jacobsen v. Ragsdale, 160 Ill. App. 3d 656, 513 N.E.2d 1112 (5th Dist. 1987);
Goldberg v. Swedish Covenant Hosp., 160 Il. App. 3d 857, 513 N.E.2d 919 (1st Dist. 1987);
Metcalfe v. St. Elizabeth's Hosp., 160 Il. App. 3d 47, 513 N.E.2d 12 (5th Dist. 1987)
(attempted to extend the rule to motions to dismiss based on an affirmative defense); Rohr v.
Knaus, 153 Ill. App. 3d 1013, 506 N.E.2d 634 (5th Dist. 1987) (attempted to extend rule to
motions for summary judgment).
193. 127 Ill. 2d at 126, 535 N.E.2d at 860.
194. Id. at 132, 535 N.E.2d at 863. Federal Rule 41(a) provides in pertinent part:
[A]n action may be dismissed by the plaintiff without order of court (i) by filing a
notice of dismissal at any time before service by the adverse party of an answer or
of a motion for summary judgment, whichever first occurs, or (ii) by filing a
stipulation of dismissal signed by all parties who have appeared in the action.
FED. R. Crv. P. 41(a).
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section 2-1009 gave them an absolute right to dismiss their action at
any time prior to trial.
The supreme court, while refusing to adopt the philosophy of
Rule 41(a), concluded that the plaintiff's right to voluntarily dismiss
was not absolute and held that the circuit court may hear a potentially
dispositive motion prior to its consideration of a plaintiff's section
2-1009 motion for voluntary dismissal. 95 The court noted that as
currently applied, section 2-1009 allowed plaintiffs to dismiss a
deteriorating case or interpose needless delay to avoid an adverse
ruling, both of which increase docket congestion and interfere with
the ability of the court to discharge its duties. 196 The court further
held that its ruling was to have prospective application only. The
court noted that Gibellina, unlike Martinez, did effect a "clear
departure from prior precedent" by carving out an exception to
section 2-1009.' 9"
Contrary to the direction of the O'Connell, Martinez, and Gibellina trilogy, in Kilpatrick v. First Church of the Nazarene,198 the
Fourth District refused to extend O'Connell beyond its facts and
held that an absolute right to voluntary dismissal existed following
a mistrial despite the fact that the mistrial was necessitated by the
misconduct of the plaintiff's counsel. In Kilpatrick, a first trial was
commenced in 1986 with the selection of four jurors. This trial was
continued until 1987,19 when a second trial began and proceeded
into the evidentiary stage. Due to repeated misconduct of the plaintiff's counsel, the second trial resulted in a mistrial. Following an
unsuccessful attempt to change judges, the plaintiff voluntarily dismissed her action under section 2-1009.
On appeal, the defendants argued first that the proceedings in
1986 constituted the "commencement" of trial as the parties had
begun jury selection and had selected four jurors. The defendant

195. Gibeilina, 127 11. 2d at 137-38, 535 N.E.2d at 866.
196. The court stated that it was "apparent that an ever increasing number of plaintiffs are
using a section 2-1009 motion to avoid a potential decision on the 'merits' or to avoid an
adverse ruling as opposed to using it to correct a procedural or technical defect." Id. at 137,
535 N.E.2d at 865. The court also observed that "the allowance of an unrestricted right to
dismiss and refile an action in the face of a potentially dispositive motion is not only increasing
the burden on the already crowded dockets of our courts, but is also infringing on the authority
of the judiciary to discharge its duties fairly and expeditiously." Id. at 137, 535 N.E.2d at

866.
197. Id. at 138, 535 N.E.2d at 866.
198. 177 Ill. App. 3d 83, 531 N.E.2d 1135 (4th Dist. 1988).
199. The trial was continued as a dispute arose during the defendant's voir dire regarding
the presence of an issue of comparative fault. Id. at 84, 531 N.E.2d at 1136.
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relied on Cummings v. Simmons," where the court held that once
jury selection had commenced, a trial had begun for the purposes
of section 2-1009. The Kilpatrick court, however, rejected the defendants' argument and noted that unlike Cummings, the voluntary
dismissal had occurred more than one year after the selection of the
jurors and after a continuance of the trial date. The court stated
that "if a trial is set and commenced but, for some reason is canceled,
the right to absolute dismissal is still available.' ' 2 1
The defendants also argued that the plaintiff's absolute right to
dismiss should be curtailed because the plaintiff's counsel deliberately
caused the mistrial. The defendant's noted that it was inequitable to
allow the plaintiffs to "manipulate and abuse" the system. The
court, while acknowledging that there was some merit to the defendants' argument, disagreed and stated that "the voluntary dismissal
statute grants plaintiffs the absolute privilege to dismiss regardless
of the circumstances or motive."202
Interestingly, the court based its interpretation of O'Connell's
limitations on Rohr v. Knaus230 which stated that, "any further
restriction of the privilege of voluntary dismissal should be addressed
to the general assembly or to the supreme court should it extend the
holding of O'Connell."' ' 0 In light of Gibellina and Martinez, it
appears as if the supreme court has spoken and that the Kilpatrick
defendants should consider further appeal. The defendants' second
argument in Kilpatrick is highly consistent with the underpinnings of
the O'Connell trilogy. The defendants argued that a voluntary dismissal allowed the plaintiffs to avoid the policy of section 2-1009
"by intentionally creating a mistrial and moving for a dismissal after
the mistrial was ordered."201 Although a mistrial vitiates all proceedings up to that time, the defendants argued that an exception should
be made where counsel's deliberate conduct caused the mistrial. 2°6

200. 167 Ill. App. 3d 544, 521 N.E.2d 634 (4th Dist. 1988). In Cummings, the plaintiff
moved for a voluntary dismissal after four jurors were sworn. The circuit court granted the
plaintiff's motion, which was reversed on appeal. The court noted that "[tlo allow plaintiff
to dismiss her cause of action after voir dire has begun and before all 12 jurors are sworn in
can result in abuse analogous to that designed to be corrected by section 2-1009." Id. at 548,
521 N.E.2d at 637.
201. 177 Ill.
App. 3d at 87, 531 N.E.2d at 1137.
202. Id. at 88, 531 N.E.2d at 1138-39.
203. 153 I11.App. 3d 1013, 1015, 506 N.E.2d 634, 636 (5th Dist. 1987).
204. Id. at 1017, 506 N.E.2d at 637.
205. Kilpatrick, 177 11. App. 3d at 88-89, 531 N.E.2d at 1138.
206. Id. at 88, 531 N.E.2d at 1138-39.
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Under the Kilpatrick court's broad reading of section 2-1009, plaintiffs could orchestrate a mistrial at any time and still obtain the
benefits of a voluntary dismissal, leaving defendants in a revolving
door of filed and dismissed actions.
B.

Collateral Estoppel

1. Defensive Use
In Simcox v. Simcox, 2 7 a case of first impression, the Illinois
Supreme Court held that children are not privies of their parents in
dissolution proceedings and thus are not collaterally estopped from
relitigating the issue of paternity in a subsequent proceeding. Linsey
Simcox, through her mother, filed a paternity action2 in the circuit
court of Cook County. Linsey's parents, Deborah and Christopher,
divorced in 1984 when Linsey was a year old. In 1986, Deborah
married Jeffrey Dear and subsequently brought the paternity action
on Linsey's behalf seeking to establish Dear as Linsey's real father.
The issue before the circuit court was whether the action was barred
by the doctrine of collateral estoppel because Linsey's paternity
previously had been determined in the judgment of dissolution. The
circuit court granted the defendant's motion to dismiss with prejudice
because the uncontested judgment of dissolution included a judicial
finding that Christopher Simcox was Linsey's father. 2°9
The issue framed by the Illinois Supreme Court was whether
Linsey was a party or in privity with the parties to the dissolution
of marriage judgment and, therefore, collaterally estopped from
bringing the paternity action. 210 Under the doctrine of collateral
estoppel, "an issue which has been addressed by a court of competent
jurisdiction cannot be relitigated in a later action between the same
parties or their privies in the same or a different cause of action."121'
The court held that Linsey had not been a party to the dissolution
proceeding despite the fact that the paternity issue was addressed in
those proceedings.2 12 The court then looked to whether Linsey was
in privity with either of her parents in the dissolution proceeding.

207.
208.
209.
210.
211.
212.

131 I1. 2d 491, 546 N.E.2d 609 (1989).
Such actions are permitted under ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 40, 11 2501-2507 (1989).
Simcox, 131 Ill.
2d at 494, 546 N.E.2d at 610.
Id.
Id. at 496, 546 N.E.2d at 611.
Id. at 497, 546 N.E.2d at 611.
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Relying exclusively on rulings from other states which have held that
children are not privies of their parents in dissolution proceedings
because their interests are not properly represented in such proceedings, the court held that the plaintiff was not collaterally estopped
from bringing the instant paternity action because she previously had
not been in privity with the parties to the dissolution action.213
A concurring opinion filed by Justice Ryan made the significant
point that section 506 of the Illinois Marriage and Dissolution of
Marriage Act 21 4 permits the court to appoint a guardian ad litem to
represent the interests of minor children. No such appointment had
been made on Linsey's behalf in the dissolution action. Had such an
appointment been made, the instant case would have presented a
different question and possibly a very different result.
2.

Offensive Use

In In re Owens,21 1 the Illinois Supreme Court considered whether
collateral estoppel should be used offensively as readily as it is used
defensively. The collateral estoppel issue arose from an action filed
by Burt and John Beatty against Carroll and Gerald Owens, alleging
that the Owens brothers fraudulently breached a partnership agreement and corresponding fiduciary duties owed to the Beattys. The
21 6
circuit court found for plaintiffs as to both allegations.
Because the Owens brothers were also attorneys, they faced
disciplinary proceedings before the Attorney Registration and Disciplinary Commission (ARDC) at the termination of the civil action.
The ARDC administrator filed a motion for summary determination
of major issues based on the factual findings of the previous civil
case.2" 7 The motion emphasized that the burden of proof in a civil
fraud action, clear and convincing evidence, is the same as that used
in a disciplinary action.2"' The motion was granted and respondents
were precluded from presenting evidence except in extenuation and
mitigation. 21 9
The question before the supreme court was whether the ARDC
could offensively collaterally estop the respondents from relitigating

213. Id. at 496, 546
214. ILL. REV. STAT.
215. 125 Ill. 2d 390,
216. Id. at 394, 532
217. Id. at 395, 532
218. Id. at 395, 532
219. Id.

N.E.2d at 611.

ch. 40,

1 506 (1989).

532 N.E.2d 248 (1989).
N.E.2d at 249.
N.E.2d at 249.
N.E.2d at 250.
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facts resolved adversely to them in the prior civil proceeding because
the factual findings in both proceedings were based on a clear and
convincing standard of proof. 22° The court's analysis focused on
concerns of judicial efficiency and fairness to the defendant.
As a preliminary matter, the court stated that collateral estoppel
may be used offensively when a plaintiff forecloses a defendant from
relitigating an issue which had been litigated and found against the
defendant in a prior action to which the current plaintiff was not a
party.Y' The court explained that although offensive collateral estoppel was formerly treated in the same manner as defensive collateral
estoppel, 222 the elimination of the mutuality requirement223 broadened
the use of collateral estoppel considerably, and thus brought into
question the wisdom of allowing collateral estoppel to be used
offensively as freely as it is used defensively.2 Specifically, the court
stressed that offensive collateral estoppel does not always foster
judicial economy and fairness to the defendant. The court noted that
while defensive collateral estoppel provides an incentive for the
plaintiff to join all defendants in one action, offensive collateral
estoppel can have the opposite effect. Because offensive collateral
estoppel allows a plaintiff to rely on a previous judgment against a
defendant without being bound by that judgment if the defendant
prevails, the plaintiff has no reason not to adopt a "wait and see"
attitude in hope that the first action by another plaintiff will result
in a favorable judgment. Consequently, the court warned, the liberal
use of offensive collateral estoppel will increase rather than decrease
the total amount of litigation since potential plaintiffs risk nothing
by not intervening in the first action.225
As to the fairness issue, the court was concerned that the
offensive use of collateral estoppel imposed on the defendant the
dilemma of needlessly but aggressively litigating an insignificant case
to preclude the adverse use of findings in a subsequent, though
unforeseeable, suit. 6 The court observed that this dilemma would
220. Id. at 397, 532 N.E.2d at 250-51.
221. Id.
222. Id. at 397, 532 N.E.2d at 251.
223. Id. at 398, 532 N.E.2d at 251. Under the mutuality doctrine, neither party could assert
a prior factual finding to estop the others unless both parties were bound by the judgment.
In re Hutul, 54 Ill. 2d 209, 296 N.E.2d 332 (1973). The mutuality requirement was abandoned
in Illinois State Chamber of Commerce v. Pollution Control Bd., 78 Ill. 2d 1, 398 N.E.2d 9

(1979).
224. Owens, 125 I11.2d at 398, 532 N.E.2d at 251.
225. Id. at 399, 532 N.E.2d at 251.
226. Id.
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not arise in the instance of a criminal conviction involving moral
turpitude since presumably, a defendant would make "every reasonable effort to cast doubt on his guilt" in such an action .227 The
instant action, however, was civil rather than criminal in nature.
Applying these concerns to the case at hand, the court held that
the use of offensive collateral estoppel is not appropriate in disciplinary proceedings based on civil litigation because the risk of prejudice
to the defendant in being denied a hearing on the fundamental facts
of a disciplinary complaint outweighed whatever judicial seconomy
was gained from estopping the relitigation of those facts.2
The court further stated that, although it was compelled to rely
on the ARDC Hearing and Review Boards to enforce the disciplinary
code, the ultimate responsibility of determining what conduct is
subject to discipline and the severity of the discipline in a particular
case is a nondelegable function of the judiciary even if the factfinding function sometimes must be relegated to proceedings outside
of formal disciplinary proceedings. Such substitute proceedings, however, must rise to the same level of litigation-worthiness as the charge
of the ARDC to ensure that the relevant issues have been fully and
fairly litigated. 229
Vacation of Judgments

C.

In DiNardo v. Lamela,

30

the Second District vacated a default

judgment in favor of a pro se defendant, upholding the appealability
of motions to quash for lack of jurisdiction. State Farm Automobile
Insurance Company, as subrogee of Christopher DiNardo, filed a
personal injury complaint against the defendant, Lamela. The plaintiff's first attempt to serve Lamela failed, allegedly because she had
moved out of the state. 23' The plaintiff then served an alias summons

on the Secretary of State in accordance with section 10-301 of the
Illinois Vehicle Code, 23 2 which provides for substitute service of

process in cases where claims arise from the use of a motor vehicle
within Illinois and the defendant is a non-resident or subsequently
becomes a non-resident.2 3 The defendant failed to appear and a
default judgment was entered against her for $2,823.75.
227.
228.
229.
230.
231.
232.
233.

Id.at 401, 532 N.E.2d at 252.
Id.
Id. at 400, 532 N.E.2d at 252.
183 Il. App. 3d 1098, 539 N.E.2d 1306 (2d Dist. 1989).
Id.at 1100, 539 N.E.2d at 1307.
ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 95 1/2, 1 10-301(b) (1989).
DiNardo, 183 I11.App. 3d at 1100, 539 N.E.2d at 1307.
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Less than two years later, the defendant filed two pro se motions
entitled "Notice to Vacate" and "Reinstate. ' 23 4 The "Reinstate"
motion stated: "I moved to default defendant $2823.75.' 235 The
court sua sponte treated this motion as a section 2-1401 motion to
vacate. 23 6 The defendant testified that she received no notice of prior
proceedings and did not become aware of the default judgment until
she learned that her driver's license had been suspended. Based upon
this testimony, the court vacated the default judgment. The plaintiff
27
subsequently appealed.
The appellate court treated the defendant's motion as a motion
to quash service of process. Analysis of applicable case law revealed
a split in authority as to the appealability of an order quashing
service. 23 The court found in favor of the line of cases supporting
appealability based on the Illinois Supreme Court case of Brauer
Machine & Supply Co. v. Parkhill Truck Co.,239 which stated:
It is true, the order, in form, was only an order quashing the service
of the summons. It was not an order dismissing the suit, nor was it
in the form of a final judgment on the merits. Regardless of its form,
however, it was a complete and final disposition of the case, based
upon the conclusion the court had reached that appellee was not
amenable to the service of process in the manner in which the summons
was served. On that issue it was not only as effectual and conclusive
but it was as final as any decision upon the merits. The result was
the same.
If it should be held that an order of this character is not
appealable, then there would be no method by which a plaintiff could
obtain a review of an order of the trial court quashing the service of
process.m
An examination of the record disclosed ample support for defendant's
assertion that she had not been served and that the plaintiff had failed
to comply with the substitute service provisions of paragraph 10-301.2'
Finding that the plaintiff had failed to serve the defendant properly,

234. Id.
235. Id.
236. Id. at 1100, 539 N.E.2d 1307-08. Section 2-1401 provides, in pertinent part: "(a) Relief
from final orders and judgments, after 30 days from the entry thereof, may be had upon
petition as provided in this Section." IL. Rv. STAT. ch. 110, 1 2-1401 (1989).
237. DiNardo, 183 IlU. App. 3d at 1101, 539 N.E.2d at 1308.
238. Id. at 1101-02, 539 N.E.2d at 1308.
239. 383 Ill. 569, 50 N.E.2d 836 (1943).
240. Id. at 577-78, 50 N.E.2d at 840.
241. DiNardo, 183 Ill. App. 3d at 1103, 539 N.E.2d at 1310.
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the appellate court affirmed the circuit court's order vacating the default
judgment. 2
D.

Comity

In Schoeberlein v. Purdue University,' the Illinois Supreme Court
had to decide as a matter of first impression if it should recognize
Indiana's sovereign immunity statute, which attempts to immunize
Indiana from suit outside of its own courts. The products liability
complaint alleged that Indiana, through Purdue University, sold a
defective product to a company in Illinois and that the product injured
an Illinois resident. 2 4
As a threshold matter, the court recognized that, absent comity,
Indiana's sovereign immunity statute would have no force and effect
beyond Indiana and that Illinois was under no compulsion to recognize
such law if doing so contravened Illinois' own public policy. 241 The
only such policy which the court could identify was article 1, section
12 of the Illinois Constitution,2 6 which provides that "[e]very person
shall find a certain remedy ... for all injuries and wrongs .... 247
The court construed this language as aspirational rather than mandatory
and found that Indiana's sovereign immunity statute, which restricts
suits against Indiana to Indiana courts but does not bar them outright,
did not contravene section 12.4 The court also found great similarity
between Indiana's sovereign immunity statute and the Illinois Court of
Claims Act, u 9 which places restrictions on both choice of forum and
recoverable amount in actions brought against the state or any instrumentality thereof. 25 The court concluded that recognizing Indiana's
sovereign immunity statute would not contravene any relevant Illinois
public policy. 251
The court's analysis and holding are unconvincing for many
reasons. First, the only similarity between the Illinois Court of Claims
Act and Indiana's sovereign immunity statute are that both acts relate
to the manner in which the sovereign can be sued. Structurally and

242.
243.
244.
245.
246.
247.
248.
249.
250.
251.

Id. at 1104, 539 N.E.2d at 1310.
129 111.2d 372, 544 N.E.2d 283 (1989).
Id. at 375, 544 N.E.2d at 284.
Id. at 377, 544 N.E.2d at 285.
ILL. CONST. art I., § 12.
Schoeberlein, 129 Ill.
2d at 379, 544 N.E.2d at 286.
Id.
ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 37, 439.8 (1989).
Schoeberlein, 129 Ill.
2d at 380, 544 N.E.2d at 286.

Id.
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philosophically, the acts are otherwise very different. The Illinois' Court
of Claims Act conditions and limits the plaintiff's forum and recoverable amount in actions brought against the sovereign. Indiana's statute
bars such suits altogether unless they are brought in Indiana. It is one
thing to condition, it is quite another to bar all foreign actions by
divesting all other states and tribunals of jurisdiction over the State of
Indiana. That enlargement of sovereign autonomy should offend every
other state's judicial integrity. What would happen, for example, if
the State of Illinois wanted to sue the State of Indiana, or, if Illinois
wanted to counterclaim in a suit brought by-Indiana?
A second problem with the court's analysis is that Indiana's
sovereign immunity law does, in fact, contravene Illinois' aspirational
policy of providing a remedy for every cognizable wrong. An Illinois
citizen was injured in Illinois by a product sold to an Illinois company.
Notwithstanding the court's advice to the plaintiff to sue in the Indiana
courts, in fact he cannot. Indiana requires a plaintiff to provide notice
of injury to the state within 180 days of injury. That period had long
since lapsed by the time the court rendered its opinion. In the contexts
of products liability, long-arm jurisdiction, and environmental law,
Illinois has expressed a strong state interest in providing redress for its
citizens in Illinois courts. What's the difference here?
Third, Indiana was not acting in a sovereign capacity when it sold
the product. This transaction did not implicate either its regulatory
function, service function, or protective function. Rather, as the dissent
aptly stated:
Indiana, through Purdue, voluntarily sold an allegedly defective
product to a company in Illinois and the product injured an Illinois
resident. Indiana conducted itself in Illinois as if it were any other
non-resident business. Indiana chose to sell its product outside 'its
boundaries, thereby taking the risk that the product would injure
someone outside its borders. The California court in Hall v. University
Of Nevada stated:
"We have concluded that sister states who engage in activities within
California are subject to our laws with respect to those activities and
are subject to suit in California courts with respect to those activities.
When the sister state enters into activities in this state, it is not
exercising sovereign power over the citizens of this state and is not
entitled to the benefits of the sovereign immunity doctrine as to those
activities unless this state has conferred immunity by law or as a
25 2
matter of comity.1
252. Id. at 385-86, 544 N.E.2d at 288-89 (quoting Hall, 8 Cal. 3d 522, 524, 503 P.2d 1363,
1364, 105 Cal. Rptr. 355, 356 (1972), aff'd, 440 U.S. 410 (1979)).
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A final problem with Schoeberlein is the underlying premise of
the court's opinion that if it recognizes the sovereign immunity of other
states, such states will reciprocally recognize the sovereign immunity of
Illinois. This approach puts Illinois' appreciation of comity on the
same level as the golden rule. The unpleasant reality, however, is that
after the United States Supreme Court's affirmation of Nevada v.
Hall, other states are not obligated to recognize sister states' sovereign
immunity, and many, in fact, have not. 23

253. Id. at 384, 544 N.E.2d at 288.
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